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Abstract 1.1 Previous Work
Robots are used in inaccessible or hazardous environments in
order to alleviate some of the time, cost and risk involved in
preparing men to endure these conditions. In order to per-
form their expected tasks, the robots are often quite complex,
thus increasing their potential for failures. If men must be sent
into these environments to repair each component failure in the
robot, the advantages of using the robot are quickly lost. Fault
tolerant robots are needed which can effectively cope with fail-
ures and continue their tasks until repairs can be realistically
scheduled. Before fault tolerant capabilities can be created,
methods of detecting and pinpointing failures must be perfected.
This paper develops a basic fault tree analysis of a robot in order
to obtain a better understanding of where failures can occur and
how they contribute to other failures in the robot. The resulting
failure flow chart can also be used to analyze the resiliency of
the robot in the presence of specific faults. By simulating robot
failures and fault detection schemes, the problems involved in
detecting failures for robots are explored in more depth. Future
work will extend the analyses done in this paper to enhance
Trick, a robotic simulation testbed, with fault tolerant capabil-
ities in an expert system package.
1 Introduction
In hazardous environments or environments which arc not read-
ily accessible to man, robots must be able to efficiently adapt
to failures in both software and hardware in order to continue
working until the problem can be realistically repaired. Before
a robot can try to cope with a failure, however, it must first
be able to detect and pinpoint the problem. This paper devel-
ops a basic fault tree analysis of robots in order to obtain a
better understanding of where failures can occur and how they
contribute to other failures or lindtations in each robot. The
resulting flow chart style picture of failures in a robot can also
be used to analyze the resiliency of the robot in the presence of
specific faults. Once a failure has been detected, the robot can
reorganize its view of its internal structure in such a way as to
hide or isolate the fault so the robot can conlinue working. The
focus of this research is on filming real-thne fault detection and
fault tolerance methods which maintain as much of the robot's
functionality as possible while not requiring that redundant or
extra parts be added to the robot.
1.1.1 Redundancy Based Fault Tolerance
Previous work on fault tolerance in robotics has concentrated on
dealing with faults in one specific part of the robot (mechanical
failure in the motor, kinematic joint failure, etc.) with only to-
ken thought going to the more critical, systemwide effect of the
failures. Relatively little focus has been given to the question of
how to detect failures in robots. Previous research tends to con-
centrate on fault tolerance algorithms, especially those schemes
which rely on duplicating parts such ms joint motors [15,19] for
their fault tolerant abilities. These redundancy based schemes
are similar to several computer fault tolerant Mgorithms which
are also based on redundancy of parts. One common computer
fault tolerant algorithm is Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
in which three processors all work on the same problem and
compare their results. If one of the processors is faulty and its
result does not agree with the results of the other two proces-
sors, the faulty processor is voted out of the final decision and
the correct result is passed on to the rest of the system. This
fault tolerance scheme fails, however, if more than one of the
processors is faulty. Duldication of physical parts provides a
backup in case the element performing the work fails. Redun-
dancy of parts can also provide a useful means of checking to
see if a component is in error.
For tile equivalent redundancy based robot fault tolerant al-
gorithms, two motors have been placed in each robot joint to
provide a backup in case one motor stalls, runs away, or be-
gins free-spinning. The fault tolerant advantages of reduudancy
have also led to adding extra paralkd structures, such as seven
legs when only six are needed, in order to allow many differ-
ent configurations in the presence of a failure. Previous work
by Tesar, et al at UT, Austin [15] and independently by "Wu
[19] with Lockheed at Johnson Space Center have explored the
aforementioned lnethod of duplicating nlotors. Two motors in a
joint work together so as to provide one output velocity for the
joint. When one of the motors breaks, the other one takes over
the faulty motor's functions. The faulty motor must be isolated
from the system or the second motor must be able to adjust its
output to account for any transieuts introduced to the system
by the failed motor. If the robot is performing a time-crilical
or delicate task, fault tolerauce must allow the robot to get a
run-away motor under control quickly before any dalnage to the
environn/ent or the robot occurs.
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1.1.2 Structure-Independent Fault Tolerance
Many useful robots have already been created. In order to pro-
vide fault tolerance for these robots without redesigning them,
algorithms need to be developed that will utilize the advantages
of the existing structure and not require the addition of extra
motors, sensors, or other components to the robot [16]. These
algorithms should be easily adaptable to most robots regardless
of the robot structure.
To avoid adding redundant parts for fault tolerance in comput-
ers, algorithms have been developed which reconfigure the data
or code in a computer system among the working parts after one
component has failed. Some computer fault tolerant systems
handle a fault by allowing a graceful degradation in function-
ality or speed. The literature speaks of time redundancy [,1] ill
which a computational cycle is lengthened so a fault-free part (or
parts) will have enough time to handle the tasks era faulty com-
ponent. Other systems use set-swltching or processor-switching
schemes [4] for reeonfiguration. In processor-switching, fault-
free components can be collected to form a basic subpart of the
configuration, such as a row of an array, until the full config-
uration is achieved. This method may, however, require many
extra interconnections between components. In software, check
bits and error correction codes help insure that data is success-
fully transmitted in tile system and allow a reconstruction of
the original data if a transmission line is faulty.
For robotics, however, little work has been done in developing
algorithms for accommodating a failure using only the available
physical parts. Many robots exist which do not ]lave redundant
motors or extensive sensors in tile joints. Duplicating motors
increases the size of the robot, the cost involved ill building it,
and the weight and inertia which affect the lobot controller. It
would thus be cost effective to find fault tolerance schemes that
do not rely on a specific robotic architecture to continue working
but reorganize the robotic algorithms in the controller or utilize
the self-motion capabifity of robots with redundant joints. In
order to develop these schemes, the advantages and capabilities
of a general robot architecture must be researched.
Maciejewski at Purdue University has quantified the effect of
joint failure on the remaining dexterity of a kinematically re-
dundant manipulator [10]. lie calculates an optimal configura-
tion of redundant arms to maximize the fault tolerance while
minimizing tile degradation of the system in the event of a faib
ure. IIis method currently only provides fault tolerance if the
robot is near this initial configuration and can try and arrange
its joints to mimic the fault safe configuration as close as pos-
sible. Robot controllers may further attempt to keep tile robot
arm in a configuration where the joints are arranged to stay
away from any possible singularities or uncomfortable positions
in case a joint fails during the operation. These studies do not
rely on adding extra motors or other components to the robot,
but they also do not explore what the robot controller must do
in order to utihze the remaining dexterity to continue its tasks.
This paper considers and analyzes systemwide failures (elec-
tromechanical, computer software/hardware, etc.) and their
inter-relationship via fault trees. We focus on developing fault
detection and fault tolerance schemes using only tile compo-
nents normally available to the robot. Previous work in fault
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Figure 1: Robe-MEDIC Fault Tolerance Environment.
tolerance forms a subset of our analysis, and our structure has
the additional advantage of allowing the best results from more
specific fault schemes to be embedded into our tree analysis,
1.2 Riceobot and Robe-MEDIC
This paper begins by specifically analyzing the fault trees of
the Rice University robot, the Riceobot, but the results apply
to most robots. The fault tolerant algorithms developed from
this analysis will be embedded into the CLIPS expert system
environment [6]. This NASA-developed public domain software
package is commonly used by government agencies arid is run-
ning on our computer systems.
The resulting expert system package, Robe-MEDIC (Robot Ma-
nipulator Error Detection and Intelligent Correction) will pro-
vide diagnostic assistance to the operator and wilt interface with
the control computer of the robot as shown in Figure 1. Robe-
MEDIC will be able to use the fault trees as a flow chart of
failures. Nodes in the trees will have some fault tolerant action
associated with them that veil] allow the robot to take advantage
of inherent backup or Mternate paths charted by the fault tree.
By maneuvering around tile trees, Robe-MEDIC will perform
fault tolerant recovery actions as a sequence of these smaller,
simpler actions.
1.3 Fault Detection Simulator and Trick
In addition to the fault tree analysis, we are examining fail-
ures and testing fault detection schemes using a simulation of
a generic four link, planar robot. We will be integrating the
concepts derived from the simulator into Trick Ill, a robotics
software testbed developed at NASA Johnson Space Center by
Leslie J. Quiocho and Robert Bailey.
The Trick software package already contains information to
model the seven-joint Robotic Research Arms, the Space Shut-
tle RMS, and the full Riceobot with base and two arms. Data
modules provided by Trick allow the user to build customized
robots with various types of sensors, joints, and links. Our re-
search is expanding the capabilities of the software to model
fault detection and tolerance algorithms. The flexibility of the
software allows the failure analysis developed in this paper to
be extended to a variety of different robots.
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Table I: Fault Tree Analysis Symbols
Symbol Function
AND gate All inputs required to produce output
event.
OR gate Any one input event causes the output
event.
Rectangle A malfunction which results from a
combination of fault events through
logic gates.
Diamond A fault event for which the causes are
left undeveloped.
Circle A basic fault event. This includes
O component failures whose frequencyand failure mode are known.
Triangle A suppressed tree. The tree is detailed
in another figure.
A Markov or semi-Markov model approach to probability anal-
ysis can also be developed based on the PAWS/STEM [3] and
CARE III [14] reliability analysis packages. These packages can
analyze simpler fault trees as well as Markov chains, but they
are not necessarily optimized to handle the simpler structures
[11]. These analysis tools were also not designed for robotics
and thus would not take advantage of some of the commonality
within robot structures. We will include some of the advan-
tageous aspects of using Markov models in our CLIPS-based
expert system, Robe-MEDIC.
A quantitative analysis provides a measure of the overall chance
of a complete failure for each robot. The structure provided by
the fault trees organizes the probabilities appropriately for the
robot system and provides a simple map of how the probabilities
relate to each other. Using the trees, robots of significantly
different origin and structure can be compared for fault tolerant
abilities and survivability. The integrated Robe-MEDIC expert
system will provide diagnostic capabilities by using the fault
trees and will alert the operator of an impending failure. It
can be used for off-line comparisons of robots or for suggesting
possible corrective actions to an operator and the low-level robot
controller during real operations.
2 Robotic Fault Tree Analysis
2.1 Analysis Technique
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive method in wlfich falI-
ure paths are identified by using a fauh tree drawing or graphical
representation of the flow of fault events [2]. FTA is a well-
known analysis technique often used in industry for computer
control systems and large industrial plants. Each event in the
tree is a component failure, an external disturbance, or a system
operation. The top event is the undesired event being analyzed
and, in this research, is the failure of the entire robot. The
events are connected by logic symbols to create a logical tree of
failures. Some of the basic symbols are explained in Table I.
Tim explanation of the FTA technique in [2] promotes a top
down development of the fault tree. The top event is broken
down into primary events that can, through some logical com-
bination, cause the failure at the top. This process is repeated
to deeper levels until a basic event or an undeveloped event is
reached. Some conditions or causes may be left undeveloped
if the probability that they will occur is small enough to be
ignored.
2.2 Failure Propagation/Probability Analysis
The information available in the fault trees may be enhanced by
a quantitative analysis of the failures. Failure rates are assigned
to each input event and propagated up tbe tree based on the
rules of the connecting logic gates. The output of an OR gate is
the sum of the inputs. The resulting probability of the combined
input events is greater than the probability of an individual
input event. The output of an AND gate is the product of its
inputs. The probability of all the events occurring is less than
the probability of any one occurring. The AND gate represents
a redundant measurement or capability and is more desirable in
the tree since the probability of a failure decreases through the
combination of lower level events.
2.3 Fault Tree Pruning
A suggested drawback of FTA is that there is no way to ensure
that all the causes of a failure have been evaluated [2]. The
designer tends to identify the iml)ortant or most obvious events
that would cause a given failure, tIowever, the events that are
not modeled normally have a low probability of occurring and
can be ignored or treated as a basic event without overly biasing
the analysis.
Several failures may also be interconnected creating lateral
branches or cycles in the fault tree. In some robots, one nrotion
at a joint may be coupled with another motion such that fail-
ure of either motion causes the failure of the other. It is also
difficult to determine the relationships between some failures.
For example, the failure of all the internal feedback sensors at
the elbow joint of a robot may make the robot blind to the
elbow's position. The elbow has not actually failed, but the
robot is unable to detect the results of any commands sent to
the elbow. Thus, the sensor lnalfunction does not contribute to
an elbow failure specifically but may cause a failure of the en-
tire robot. Relationships like these make the tree complex and
difficult to analyze. These problems can be overcome by work-
ing to simplify the tree. In the case of the coupled motions,
the two failures can be considered as one with twice as likely a
probability of occurring.
2.4 Riceobot Fault Trees
To provide a foundation for the analysis of general robots, we
have chosen to analyze the arm of the Rice University Riceobot.
The arm has eight degrees of fieedom: three motions in the
shoulder (z translation, pitch, and yaw), two motions in the
elbow (roll and pitch), and three motions in the wrist (roll,
pitch, and yaw). The results obtained from the Riceobot apply
to most general robots especially since the Riceobot has a wide
variety of commonly used link, joint, and motor arrangements.
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Figure 2: Top Level Fault Tree for Entire Riceobot.
Overall Robot Failure
Joint Failures
The Riceobot has two directly driven motions: the shoulder z-
direction motion and the wrist rollmotion (Figure 3). The fault
trees for these motions are quite simple since only the failureof
the motor plays an important role in the failureof the motion.
The other motions of the Riceobot depend on some form ofgear-
train assembly to allow the spatially separated motor to drive
the joint. Failure of the gear-train can be caused by basic events
as simple as a loosening of the chain or cable.
Motor and Sensor Failures
The probability of a motor failure is dependent on the type
of motor used. The Riceobot contains both brushless DC and
stepper motors. Each motor also has a gear box which may
fail due to gear slippage or wear. A power failure affects all
motors as well as any other electrically driven parts in the robot,
but each motor could lose power separately if its specific power
cables break. A motor failure could conceivably algo be the
cause of a sensor failure when sensors are mounted on the shafts
of the motors. Sensors are also affected by incorrect calibration
and external noise or vibrations (see Figure 4).
Several fault trees have been developed and a few are reproduced
in the following pages. The top event is obviously the failure
of the entire robot (Figure 2). The primary causes of a robot
failure are power failure, computer system failure, or a combina-
tion of failures of the joints. If the robot is fault tolerant, it can
withstand the failure of several joints. By stablizing the faulty
motion or joint in some manner (such as locking the joint), it
is possible that the other motions can still provide some func-
tional capability to the robot. This ability results in the AND
gate combining the joint failures in Figure 2 and decreases the
probability of a failure of the robot.
Computer System Failures
The computer system of the Riceobot consists of three main
parts: (1) amplifiers which read fi'om the optical encoders and
drive the motors, (2) servo control chips which store hlforma-
tion about the different motors and convert the desired angles
into currents for each motor, and (3) an on-board host computer
which is programmed in C and computes the desired angles for
the desired motions (Figure 5). These three parts each con-
tain at least one board filled with TTL chips, capacitors, power
transistors, resistors, and other analog and digital circuit com-
ponents. A failure of any one of these parts may not cause a
iI
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Figure 3: Sub-Level Fault Tree for Wrist System.
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Figure 4: Sub-Level Fault Tree for Sensor System.
failure of the entire board; but if a board did fail, the robot
would be unable to function. The robot cannot withstand the
failure of all the serve controllers or all the amplifiers because
it would no longer be able to communicate with the joints.
Riceobot could then function in the presence of one sensor fail-
ure. Using the vision system for this task, however, increases
the load on the image processing software and may hinder the
system's abihty to perform its normal vision tasks.
Detecting a non-terminal failure in the computer system re-
quires some form of testing circuitry or the ability to poll com-
ponents to see if they are still alive. The IEEE standard 1149.1
Test Access Port may be incorporated into any VLSI chip on the
boards and could be used for active testing [9]. Radiation hard-
ened circuits [18] should also be used in the computer system.
Correction code bits can be used to check data transfers and
could identify a bus failure if the bits were consistently wrong.
2.5 Derived Riceobot Fault Detection
The qualitative analysis of these fault trees has proven useful in
pointing out some of the limitations of the Riceobot in regards
to fault detection and fault tolerance. With only one sensor at
each joint, the Riceobot represents the worst case scenario for
detecting sensor and joint failures. The only option available to
the fault detection software is to compare the sensed angles with
the calculated desired angles. After accounting for a predeter-
mined threshold to mask any precision errors in the calculations
or sensing equipment and possibly adjust for load effects, any
difference between the sensed and desired values must be con-
sidered the result of a failure. The computer is, however, unable
to differentiate between a sensor malfunction and an actual joint
failure due, for example, to a frozen motor. The computer must
therefore shut down the joint and proceed with fault tolerance
schemes based on a new model of the robot with fewer possible
motions.
Fault detection for the Riceobot could be improved using the
vision system. With the computer calculation and the sensor
reading, the additional joint angle information would help dis-
tinguish between a sensor error and a real joint failure. The
3 Robot Fault Detection
The fault trees give an indication of the interaction between fail-
ures in a system. The trees also provide a map of alternate paths
for detecting faults or bypassing failures. In order to expand on
this information and to show how modelling errors or other un-
certainties affect fault detection, we need to simulate the robot
and the fault detection algorithm. Because of the Riceobot's
lack of sensors and the complexity needed for its fault detec-
tion algorithm, we are initially simulating fault detection using
a computer modeled planar, four link robot [7]. The current
program will need to be expanded extensively for the Riceobot
and will be accomplished by implementing the fault detection
routine in the CLIPS expert system as part of Robe-MEDIC.
The robot consists of four cylindrical links connected end-to-
end. All joints are rotational and move in the same plane. A
simulated optical encoder and tachometer were added for each
joint. The fault tree for this robot is relatively simple (Figure 6),
We have not included the possibility of link breakage or global
power failure in the simulation. The motors are in essence direct
drive with no gear-trains and fail only in a locked mode. These
conditions pruned each joint subtree down from the complexity
of the Riceobot trees to an easily simulated failure situation.
It is interesting to note that it is the fault detection "software
which allows the joint to survive in the presence of a single sen-
sor failure thus creating the AND gate under each motor failure
in the tree. If both sensors at a joint fail, the host computer
is blind to that joint and the fault detection routine forces a
motor failure to prevent the joint from moving too far with-
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Figure 5: Sub-Level Fault Tree for Computer System.
out computer supervision. Thus, the fault detection algorithm
makes the dual sensor failure subtree a cause of the motor failure
events to protect a blind joint.
3.1 Fault Detection Simulator
The structure of the simulator is shown in Figure 7. The flow
of information is from the simulated host computer through the
robot and then the sensors to tile fault detection program and
finally back to the host computer. The host computer uses the
desired angles computed by a planner routine and the estimated
present position of the robot derived from the sensors to calcu-
late the torque necessary to move each link to its desired des-
tination. The controller is a standard proportional-derivative
(PD) computed torque type controller. The robot routine then
takes the calculated torques and determines the new position,
velocity, and acceleration for each joint. The optical encoders es-
timate the positions by truncating the value of each angle based
on each encoder's precision. The tachometers pass the velocities
through a first order filter based on a predetermined motor lag
time. The sensors are modules fi'om the Trick simulation pack-
age and represent our initial efforts at integration with Trick.
These estimates of the angles and velocities are passed into the
fault detection procedure which checks for failures. Then, the
procedure either passes to the host what it considers good esti-
mates of the position, velocity, and acceleration or signals the
motor of a joint with two bad sensors to shut down.
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Figure 7: Fault Detection Simulator Flow Chart.
3.2 Host Computer Model
The simulated host computer uses the following dynamics equa-
tion as a model for the robot [7]:
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r = [M(0_)]_+ N(0_, _, (1)
where v.is the joint torque vector, [3I] is the inertia matrix, and
N is the Coriolis and centrifugal torque vector. The [M] matrix
and N vector are computed based on the estimated angles from
the sensors. Since the robot is planar, gravity is orthogonal to
the plane of motion and there are no resultant gravity torques
to consider. Friction is also neglected in this model.
The PD controller for this model becomes:
= [M(0)]{_ + [Kp](_ - 0_)+ [1¢D1(_ --0_')}+ X__(0_,_.(2)
The matrices [Kp] and [KD] are the position and derivative
gains, respectively, and are used to control tracking and steady
state errors by feedback control. For critical damping, the gains
become:
[KD] = 203, [Kp] = w2, (3)
where w is the natural fl'equency input by the user. The natural
frequency is typica]y set to 1 for most runs of the simulator.
3.3 Robot Model
The robot simulation takes the computed torque from the sim-
ulated host computer and determines the resulting four robot
angle accelerations based on the equation:
_= [.,_:t]-'__-[.,fl]-q&). (4)
Here, [_/] and _r are the inertia matrix and Coriolis and cen-
trifugal torque vector as before but are now based on the actual
robot angles instead of the sensed angles. The matrices have
also been injected with a small constant error to simulate mod-
eling inaccuracies.
The joint angle, 0, and its first derivative are estimated by the
equations:
0, = 0,_, + (_xt)/_. (5)
e_= 0,_, + (z,t)0,. (6)
If a motor failure has occurred, 0 and 0 are set to zero to simulate
the effects of a locked motor. The position thus remains con-
stant. Only the locked motor is currently simulated, but other
failure modes could result in runaway motors or free-spinning
motors.
The robot's position, velocity, and acceleration calculated in this
procedure are sent to the sensor routines. The robot position
is Mso sent to the graphics simulator which displays the motion
on the screen. This is the same graphics program used by the
Trick simulation package.
3.4 Fault Detection Capabilities
3.4.1 Failure Modes
If a sensor breaks and the failure goes undetected, the host com-
puter will be performing its calculations using erroneous infor-
mation. In this simulator, the encoders break in a frozen mode
continuously reporting the last value read before the failure.
The tachometers fail by continuously reporting zero velocities
and thus constant positions. With these failure modes, the host
sees the error between the sensed angle and the desired angle
grow for the joint with the faulty sensor, and the control equa-
tions increase the appropriate output torque to the robot to try
and compensate for the error. The joint with the faulty sensor
swings wildly off course because the host keeps trying harder
and harder to get the broken sensor value to match the de-
sired value. Since the calculations for all the joints are based on
knowledge of where the other joints are located, all of the other
output torques are also computed incorrectly and the joints all
stray from their desired paths.
When a motor fails, it locks in position and the joint is then
unable to move. If a motor failure goes undetected, the sensors
are still reading the correct information. In reality, the motor
failure would probably result in a sensor failure as well, but the
result would still be that both sensors are reporting a constant
joint angle. The control equations try to push the broken joint
closer to the desired value but the frozen motor does not respond
to the torques. Since the sensors are still reporting the actual
position of the joint, all the other calculations are based on
correct data and the other joints can continue with their normal
motions. The plan nmst be modified, however, to get the end
effector to its desired location.
3.4.2 Thresholds
These two undetected failures reveal the importance of get-
ting accurate sensor readings and of detecting a sensor failure
quickly. A frozen nmtor is not as critical a failure in most cases
and can be dealt with at a more leisurely pace. Since the sen-
sors are not perfectly accurate, an acceptable threshold for the
error between sensor reading and desired value must be chosen.
Unfortunately, even during normal operation, the error between
the actual angle and the desired angle can be relatively large es-
pecially at the beginning of a run before the controller has had
time to bring the error under control. Choosing the maximum
error found during a failure-fl'ee run results in a threshold that is
so large, it may take several time steps to notice the error fl'om
a broken sensor. By the time the failed sensor is detected, the
robot controller has already been infected with the erroneous
information and the robot is either off course or has damaged
itself.
Fortunately, the error between the angles recorded by the two
sensors during normal operation is very small even after in-
tegrating the tachometer reading to get the angular position.
Modeling errors and errors induced by unpredicted loads affect
both sensors in a similar manner. Thus, a tight threshold can
be chosen for a comparison of the two sensed positions. If this
threshold is exceeded, the fault detection software assumes that
one of the sensors has failed and appropriately chooses one as
the working sensor fl'om which to take the recorded data. The
larger thresholds from the typical error between the sensed and
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desired angles are still monitored, however. The large thresholds
provide a means of checking for a motor failure.
The pseudo-code for these checks is reproduced below. The
angle 06 and its derivatives are the desired values. The variables
Or, Or, and 0t are the values derived from the tachometer reading.
The results based on the encoder are 0r, 0e, and /_. Finally, 0
and its derivatives are the values sent to the robot controller.
If ((encoder working) and (tachometer working)){
0 = 0_, O = Ot, O = Ot
If (([0t - 0_[) >= threshold){
if (encoder working){
tachometer = failed
}else{
encoder = failed
o = o. o = _, g =//,
}
}else{
if ((]0a - Ot]) >= tachometer-threshold)
tachometer = failed
if ((106 - 0_1) >= encoder-threshold)
encoder = failed
)
)
If ((tachometer == failed) and (encoder != failed)){
if ((]06 - 0r[) < encoder-threshold){
o=o,,o=oo,_=_o
)else{
encoder = failed
motor = failed
send stop motor signal to robot
)
)
If ((encoder = = failed) and (tachometer != failed)){
if (([06 - Ot[) < tachometer-tl, reshold){
0 = O. 0 = L,/_ =/_e
)else{
tachometer = failed
motor = failed
send stop motor signal to robot
}
)
Choosing which sensor has failed and which is still workingwhen
the tight tolerance is exceeded is the most difficult task. Intu-
itively, one would expect the sensor with a reading closer to
the desired value to be the working sensor and would switch to
obtaining all the information from that sensor. However, ex-
perience has shown that the fault detection software choses the
correct sensor only when the desired values are increasing. If
the desired angles are decreasing in value, it consistently picks
the failed sensor as the working one.
This problem is a result of the time it takes the controller to
bring the errors under control and the failure modes for the sen-
sors. Both the encoders and the tachometers fail by reporting
a constant angular position either directly or by integration of
a zero velocity. Filet, let us assume the sensors always read
less than the desired value. If a sensor fails and gets stuck at a
specific value while the desired values are increasing, the error
will grow and the fault detection routine should take the an-
gle information from the sensor that reads closer to the desired
value. However, if the sensor fails while the desired values are
decreasing, the desired values are approaching the failed value.
The error starts decreasing and the surviving sensor is often the
one whose absolute error is larger. The opposite relationships
hold if both sensors are reading values greater than the desired
angle. A failed sensor would then have the smaller error dur-
ing an increase in desired angles and the larger error during a
decrease in desired angles.
The various sensor failure situations that arise in the presence
of increasing desired values are listed in Table II. The variable
dt is the tachometer error or the absolute difference between
the desired value and the tachometer value. Similarly, de is
the encoder error. The bold faced entries are the actual sensor
failures which occur given the specified orderings of the.angles
and sensed angle errors. The entries enclosed in parentheses
are the action taken by our current fault detection algorithm
which takes into account the ordering situations described in the
preceding paragraph. The intuitive, more naive algorithm would
always choose the encoder as the survivor for the case where
dt> de and would always choose the tachometer otherwise.
The table for decreasing desired values would look similar to
Table II but would shut down the joint in the opposite column.
Table II: Failure Situations and Detection Actions for
Increasing Desired Angles
Angle
Ordering
Error Ordering
dt> de de >dt
06 < Ot,O¢ Eneoder Failed Tach Failed
(choose tach) (choose encoder)
Or, Or < 06 Tach Failed Encoder Failed
(choose encoder) (choose tach)
8t < 84 < 0e Encoder or Tach Encoder Failed
(Shut Down Joint) (choose tach)
Or < 06 < 0_ Tach Failed Eneoder or Taeh
(choose Encoder) (Shut Down Joint)
By checking whether the desired values are increasing or de-
creasing and pe,forming the appropriate comparisons to choose
the surviving sensor, the fault detection algorithm can correctly
isolate the failed sensor in 75% of the cases instead of 50% for
the naive algorithm. The remaining 2570 of the cases are incon-
clusive as either sensor failure could produce the same sensed
angle ordering for the given order of the angles. In the case
where 0e < 8d < Ot and 0a is increasing, for example, an encoder
failure would result in the encoder error growing larger while the
tachometer error still tracks the desired value. Thus, de would
most likely be greater than dr. However, if ti_e tachometer failed,
the desired value approaches the static tachometer value, and
d, would again be greater than dt (assuming the angle ordering
does not change). Both failures result in the same ordering of
the sensor errors. The algorithm shuts down the appropriate
joint to avoid choosing the wrong sensor which would feed er-
roneous information to the controller and cause other joints to
swing off course.
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The fault detection algorithm thus provides the robot with fault
tolerance of most single sensor failures by obtaining the angle
information solely from the surviving sensor. Through tile de-
tection and isolation of a sensor failure, the algorithm is able to
make use of the redundant information provided by the other
sensor. When the*algorithm cannot isolate the failure, it still
protects the system from the hazards of faulty sensor readings.
In general, our simple fault detection simulator is capable of
detecting for each joint a single sensor failure, a single sensor
failure followed by a motor failure, or a motor failure. The
simulator will eventually detect a second sensor failure and will
catch the single failures it has missed, but it has allowed enough
erroneous sensor readings through to the controller that other
joints have been knocked off course and fall as well. In order
to improve the fault detection algorithm, we must switch from
the hard-coded voting scheme presented above to other forms of
analytical redundancy which use filters [12,17], adaptive thresh-
olds [8], or parity relations [5]. Willsky gives a thorough review
of the various methods of analytical redundancy in [17] and [5].
Unfortunately, the amount of uncertainty and modeling errors
present in most robotic control systems makes several of the
proposed methods impractical. The generation of residuals us-
ing parity relations is one example of a method which would
be unsuitable for robotic applications [8]. Most of the work in
analytical redundancy has been focused on failure detection in
aircraft, power generation system and other mechanical systems
[13]. The algorithms for these systems will need to be modified
for robotics applications.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have presented new results in fault tree analysis
and fault detection for robot manipulatol.'S. This research sets
the stage for significantly enhanced activity ia fault tolerance for
robotics. Once a failure can be detected and isolated, a fault
tolerant expert system like Robo-MEDIC can proceed with the
appropriate actions to make use of the e:,:isting robot structure,
redundancy, and alternate paths. There already exist a variety
of computer fault tolerance schemes which can provide a starting
point for creating these structurally indel)endent robotic fault
tolerance algorithms.
The fault tree analysis for the Riceobot has proven useful in
pointing out some trouble spots for fault detection and fault
tolerance. Even without a quantitative analysis, the importance
of certain components and the severity of different failures are
revealed in the fault trees. For robots, the good health of the
internal sensors is shown to be extremely desirable. Erroneous
data from even one sensor at a joint can cause the whole robot
to deviate dra._tically from its course if the failure is not de-
tected quickly. Without the sensors, the robot also loses much
of its capability to detect faults. Developing methods for early
detection of sensor malfunctions thus has a high priority in this
research.
By simulating relatively simple fault detection situations, we
are gaining a better understanding of how to satisfy this need
for early detection. Our simuIator has shown that to avoid false
alarms due to modeling errors and noise we are forced to im-
plement large thresholds which let some faihHes go undetected
for too long. Other relationships must be developed concerning
the information available in order to improve the fault detection
algorithms. We will embed the algorithms in our expert system
and integrate the simulation into the Trick simulation package
to create a more flexible fault detection and faul_ tolerance sim-
ulator.
The analysis of the fault trees in this paper will be useful in
creating fault tolerant algorithms. Through an analysis of the
structures, fault tolerance schemes can be developed which will
attempt to maintain the health of the internal nodes in the
presence of failures in their children. These algorithms will rely
only on the available components or structure of the robot and
can be developed fl-om the knowledge amassed during the fault
detection simulations. The fault tolerant algorithms will also be
tested on the enhanced Trick robotic simulation package.
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